Abstract
The rise of platform-based economic organizations has reshaped the global industrial competition landscape, yet their construction pathways remain highly contingent on specific institutional contexts. Existing research predominantly focuses on technology-driven models of internet-native platforms (e.g., Amazon, Uber) in mature markets, while overlooking the dual challenges confronting traditional service industries in weak institutional environments. In developing countries, institutional deficiencies such as inadequate property rights systems, ambiguous professional standards, and underdeveloped information infrastructure exacerbate information asymmetry and transaction costs. Simultaneously, digital penetration generates latent demands for industrial platformization, yet institutional voids hinder the organic formation of critical platform governance elements like trust mechanisms. China's real estate brokerage industry exemplifies this dilemma: pre-2018 statistics revealed less than 30% standardization rate, below 15% licensed agents, and 42% fraudulent property listings, corroborating North's concept of "institutional poverty" constraining market efficiency. This institutional landscape starkly contrasts with mature Western markets where century-old systems like MLS (Multiple Listing Service) have established stable ecosystems for property sharing and commission splitting. Investigating platformization pathways in institutionally weak environments thus not only expands institutional entrepreneurship theory but also elucidates the interplay between digital empowerment and institutional construction, offering novel perspectives for interdisciplinary research in development economics and strategic management.The transformation of Lianjia into Beike provides an exemplary case for examining platformization strategies under institutional voids. As China's regional industry leader since 2001, Lianjia confronted systemic institutional gaps: absence of standardized property verification fueled market chaos with duplicate listings and price discrepancies; nonfunctional agent certification systems resulted in 80% annual workforce turnover; crucially, cutthroat competition kept inter-firm cooperation rates at merely 3.7% in 2015 versus 86% in the U.S. Realtor system. Lianjia's three-phase institutional breakthrough strategy unfolded thus: 2008-2014 saw the creation of "Housing Dictionary" (HD), a proprietary database filling institutional voids through technological means; 2015-2017 established the Agent Cooperation Network (ACN), digitally restructuring commission rules; post-2018 witnessed Beike's platformization, transforming internal capabilities into industry infrastructure. This "internal capability-building before ecosystem-shaping" approach integrated 250+ brands and 45,000 stores within five years, elevating industry cooperation rates to 76%. The case's theoretical significance lies in demonstrating how enterprises must enact "institutional compensation" to create platform emergence conditions when existing institutions fail to meet minimum trust thresholds.
Employing longitudinal case methodology, this study tracks the platformization process through three data dimensions: 1) Historical analysis of 268 internal documents (1998-2021), 97 executive speeches, and industry white papers reconstructing strategic evolution; 2) Semi-structured interviews with 32 participants (founders, platform managers, franchisees, agents) generating 450,000 words of transcripts; 3) 327 field notes from embedded observation at Beike headquarters and six branches (2019-2021). Following Gioia's methodology, we conducted three-stage coding: first-cycle open coding identified 78 firstorder concepts from raw data; second-cycle axial coding distilled 15 second-order themes; final theoretical coding yielded the "Institutional-Strategic Integration Model for Platformization in Weak Institutional Environments". Triangulation through member checking with Lianjia's strategy department enhanced validity.
Theoretically, this research extends Marquis and Raynard's (2015) institutional strategy framework by revealing three co-creation mechanisms: 1) Infrastructure strategy achieved institutional substitution through technological embedding - Beike's HD with GIS mapping and 433 data fields established de facto industry standards, mirroring World Bank-style institutional infrastructure projects through RMB 1.1 billion investments; 2) Relational strategy reconfigured production relations - ACN's 11-role collaboration system combined with credit scoring transformed cutthroat competition into structured cooperation, functionally replacing trade associations through "digital contracting"; 3) Cultural strategy cultivated shared values - mandatory proficiency exams and "Role Model Agent" campaigns elevated professional dignity indices by 41% over three years. These dimensions form an ascending spiral of "technological empowerment - rule reconstruction - cognitive renewal". The strategic inflection point occurs when network effects surpass critical market coverage, compelling firms to transition from exploiting institutional voids to becoming institutional providers - a crucial insight for understanding platform CSR evolution.
Notably, this study uncovers the paradoxical "efficiency-dignity tradeoff" in platform labor: while Beike agents achieved 3.5 million RMB annual GMV (2.3×industry average), median tenure decreased from 23 to 16.8 months (2016-2021) with 19% burnout increase.
Algorithmic management systems enforcing IM response times <30 seconds exemplify "digital Taylorism", while ACN's scoring mechanisms divert 40% effort toward metric maintenance rather than client service. Furthermore, 45.7% platform agents sign franchise contracts with 34% reduced social security coverage versus direct employment, revealing value distribution imbalances in platform ecosystems. These findings necessitate expanding platformization discourse beyond economic efficiency to encompass "humanistic modernization", informing policymaking on platform labor regulations and sustainable business models.
| Date of Award | 17 May 2025 |
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| Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisor | Weiru Chen (Supervisor) & Yuhchang Hwang (Supervisor) |
Keywords
- weak institutional environments
- platform construction
- industrial platforms
- signity of service providers