Abstract
As an important component of modern corporate governance mechanisms, equity incentives play a crucial role. Listed companies represent the most advanced form of modern enterprise systems, while market capitalization serves as the most direct and significant indicator of shareholder returns for listed companies. According to corporate governance theory, equity incentives can create a corporate governance premium for shareholders. However, in the semi-mature A-share capital market, particularly among private listed companies with a relatively high degree of marketization, does this phenomenon—consistent with international practices and market economy principles—also exist? Specifically, does the implementation of equity incentives (Yes or No) affect shareholder returns (market capitalization)? Does the frequency of implementation (More or Less) have an impact on shareholder returns (market capitalization)? And does the intensity of implementation (Strong or Weak) influence shareholder returns (market capitalization)?Since equity incentives are a corporate governance mechanism designed to resolve conflicts between principals and agents and realize the value of human capital, their impact on shareholder returns (market capitalization) should be long-term. Therefore, the hypotheses and reasoning in this paper are based on the medium-to-long-term (1–3 years) performance of shareholder returns (market capitalization), though short-term effects will also be analyzed for reference.
As a doctoral dissertation, this study not only verifies the causal characteristics of the relationship but also addresses endogeneity (i.e., whether equity incentives improve company performance, or whether high-performing companies achieve more significant effects from equity incentives). Additionally, it demonstrates the transmission mechanism—how equity incentives ultimately affect shareholder returns and market capitalization performance by influencing production efficiency, investment efficiency, and innovation efficiency. Furthermore, the dissertation conducts limited heterogeneity analysis, examining the effects across different market capitalization ranges and sectors.
Finally, the implications and contributions of this dissertation to practice, theory, and policy reflect the author’s reflections on the subject.
| Date of Award | 8 Oct 2025 |
|---|---|
| Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisor | Sheng Huang (Supervisor) & Lin Cheng (Supervisor) |
Keywords
- Listed Companies
- Equity Incentive
- Market Capitalization
- Split-Share Structure Reform
- Registration-Based System
Cite this
- Standard