折扣合同、沟通效率与绩效提升

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the efficiency losses caused by information transmission biases in the collaboration between clients (Party A) and agencies (Party B) in the advertising industry. It systematically investigates the phenomenon of frequent rework by agencies—arising from complex internal communication layers and unclear client requirements—in the traditional cooperation model. In order to solve this problem, this dissertation proposes a new discount contract mechanism based on the inheritance of principal-agent theory and organizational decision-making efficiency model. In the discount contract mechanism, the agent provides an economic discount in exchange for a channel for direct communication with the decision-making level of the principal. This mechanism can improve the accuracy and processing efficiency of information transmission, break the information barriers of multi-level organizations, reduce the information cost of both parties, reduce information distortion, and realize the improvement of the service efficiency of the agent and the economic efficiency of the client.
This dissertation first provides a detailed account of the advertising industry's background and systematically outlines the key stages of advertising agency projects, including project initiation and agency selection, the principal’s provision of the brief, the agency’s creative proposal, coordination between both parties, and execution and delivery by the agency. It highlights how information asymmetry and inefficient communication between the principal and the agent frequently lead to resource waste and execution delays. Information attrition manifests not only in the early stage, where both parties explore each other’s capabilities and intentions, but is also exacerbated during execution due to divergent feedback, lengthy hierarchies, and unexpected market shifts. Multiple case studies demonstrate that even experienced brands and agencies struggle to avoid repeated rework and efficiency losses caused by unclear strategies and disordered feedback mechanisms.
On the theoretical front, the study constructs a bilateral analytical framework comparing the traditional cooperation model with the direct communication discount contract model. The model undergoes rigorous mathematical derivation and comparative static analysis, incorporating key parameters such as the time cost of client executives, agency rework costs, discount magnitude, and the bargaining power of both parties. By solving for optimal conditions, the analysis identifies the scenarios in which the direct communication discount contract can effectively reduce the overall cooperation cost. Further comparative static analysis illustrates the impact of parameter variations on the equilibrium, thereby providing theoretical justification and practical parameter selection guidance.
In addition, this dissertation adopts an empirical research approach that combines questionnaire surveys with interviews of senior executives from leading firms, enabling in-depth data collection and statistical analysis of real-world collaboration cases in the advertising industry. The data obtained suggest that, given a fixed reference discount, both principals and agents are more willing to adopt discount contracts when collaborating with partners with whom they have had smoother past cooperation. Furthermore, the willingness to use such contracts is higher for important projects compared to non-important ones. These empirical findings validate the core predictions of the theoretical model.
In the discussion section, this dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of the research findings, acknowledging the potential limitations of the current model in simplifying complex real-world collaboration scenarios—such as the omission of multi-party participation, dynamic information updating, and the detailed roles of intermediaries in communication. It also explores the applicability of the proposed mechanism beyond the advertising industry, suggesting that it holds significant potential for cross-industry adoption in other creative service sectors. Finally, the dissertation outlines directions for future research, recommending that subsequent studies test the robustness of the discount contract mechanism across a broader range of scenarios, further expand the theoretical model to incorporate multiple participants and dynamic adjustment processes, and investigate the long-term applicability of discount contracts involving direct communication under repeated game settings.
Overall, this dissertation not only provides a systematic theoretical framework and an optimization strategy for addressing the inefficiencies caused by information transmission biases in the advertising industry but also offers practical guidance on designing effective contract incentive mechanisms. It further paves the way for future research on improving information transmission and decision-making efficiency across various industries.

Date of Award	12 Jun 2025
Original language	Chinese (Simplified)
Awarding Institution	China Europe International Business School
Supervisor	Shaowei Ke (Supervisor) & Jiahua Che (Supervisor)